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Since 9/11, the United States and the international community have taken 
numerous steps to combat the financing of terrorism. Terrorist organizations have 
adapted and become innovative to ensure their monetary funds are secure and 
undetectable. Boko Haram is one organization that has found ways to ensure its finances 
are almost undetectable. Over the past 12 years, Boko Haram has become a powerful and 
destructive violent extremist organization while obtaining millions of dollars in funding. 
The United States and the international community must look for ways to disrupt Boko 
Haram’s financial apparatus outside conventional counterthreat finance measures. The 
goal of this paper is to examine Boko Haram’s finances and the steps that have been 
taken to stop its funding, including identifying what, if any, new approaches can be used 
to prevent the ongoing funding of Boko Haram. 
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No matter how big or small violent extremist organizations (VEOs) are, without 
the ability to finance their operations and recruit new members, their existence would be 
short-lived. Colin Clarke, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, highlights this 
point by saying that the lifeblood of any VEO is its ability to generate funds.1 The ability 
of terrorist organizations to fund their operations through normal financial institutions 
suffered after 9/11 because the United States and the international community took steps 
to freeze terrorist assets. The steps taken resulted in about $147.4 million being directly 
frozen by July 2005.2 Over the past 11 years, however, terrorist organizations have 
adapted their financial support means to avoid the U.S. and international community’s 
post-9/11 terrorism financing laws. One organization that has done well in avoiding such 
laws is the Nigerian-born terrorist organization Boko Haram. Since 2002, Boko Haram 
has been able to raise millions of dollars, despite being named the deadliest terrorist 
organization in 2014.3 Since 2009, Boko Haram is responsible for killing more than 
15,000 people (more than 6,000 in 2015) and displacing nearly 2.8 million people in 
Nigeria and neighboring countries.4 
In their efforts to reduce Boko Haram’s finances, Nigeria, the United States, and 
partner nations have largely failed. In fact, U.S. officials acknowledge that the tools used 
against other VEOs have proven less effective in the financial warfare against Boko 
Haram. The difficulty that the United States and the international community have had in 
disrupting Boko Haram was highlighted by a U.S. military official, who stated, “Boko 
Haram’s inner leadership is security savvy, not only in the way it moves money but also 
                                                 
1. Colin P. Clarke, Terrorism Inc.: The Financing of Terrorism, Insurgency, and Irregular Warfare 
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2015), 1. 
2. Sener Dalyan, “Combating the Financing of Terrorism: Rethinking Strategies for Success,” Defense 
Against Terrorism Review 1, no. 1 (2008): 144. 
3. Charlotte Alfred, “Boko Haram Actually Kills More People in Terror Attacks than ISIS,” Huffington 
Post, November 18, 2015,  www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/boko-haram-
isis_us_564cd890e4b00b7997f8c15d. 
4. Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions (CRS Report No. 
R43558) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016),  www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43558.pdf. 
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in its communications, relying on face-to-face contact, since messages and calls can be 
intercepted.”5 Elizabeth Donnelly of the African Program with the London Policy 
Institute Chatham House states it best, “Before authorities can cut off Boko Haram 
funding, they have to find it. Finding it would go a long way toward crippling the 
group.”6  
The counterthreat finance measures used after 9/11 are possibly outdated for 
confronting organizations that operate outside of regulated financial institutions. For 
dealings with an organization such as Boko Haram, the ability to cut off the 
organization’s finances must be examined and fully evaluated. Normal counterthreat 
finance measures that the international community and United States have employed 
since 9/11 might need to be updated and new approaches implemented to cut of the 
funding of Boko Haram. This monograph has two primary objectives: to understand and 
assess how Boko Haram has funded its existence since 2002 and to examine the steps the 
government of Nigeria, the United States, and the international community have taken to 
cut Boko Haram’s funding off. Once such steps have been evaluated, recommendations 
will be provided of what, if anything, can be done to stop Boko Haram’s ability to fund 
its existence.  
                                                 
5. Phil Stewart and Lesley Wroughton, “How Boko Haram is Beating U.S. Efforts to Choke Its 
Financing,” Reuters, July 1, 2014,  www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nigeria-bokoharam-insight-
idUSKBN0F636920140701. 
6. Heather Murdock, “Analysts: Nigeria’s Boko Haram Funding Vast, Varied,” Voice of America, 
March 20, 2014,  www.voanews.com/content/analysts-nigerias-boko-haram-funding-vast-
varied/1875921.html. 
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II. BOKO HARAM FINANCES  
More articles and research have been dedicated to trying to understand Boko 
Haram’s organizational structure and ideology than to trying to understand how the group 
funds itself. Depending on the source, a variety of ideas and thoughts have been 
presented on how Boko Haram raises funds. For example, the ZAMUN 2015 Model 
United Nations Conference Security Council study guide mentions that the source of 
Boko Haram funding is as unclear as who the people who make up the organization.7 
Other scholarly sources point to Boko Haram’s raising money solely within Nigerian 
borders or label Boko Haram’s ability to raise money as being transnational. Yan St-
Pierre, CEO of the Counter-Terrorism Modern Security Consulting Group, believes Boko 
Haram to be a well-funded organization that relies on resources within Nigeria and West 
Africa to fund its activities.8 Likewise, Linda Thomas Greenfield, the U.S. assistant 
secretary for African affairs, mentioned in 2014 that the U.S. government believes Boko 
Haram is surviving off sophisticated criminal activities that depend heavily on 
kidnappings.9 U.S. officials are also confident that Boko Haram uses a networked system 
of couriers to move cash throughout Nigeria and across Nigeria’s border from 
neighboring countries.10  
In contrast to the ZAMUN 2015 model, research for this monograph discussed in 
this chapter appears to show that Boko Haram is well funded and does not rely on a 
single source of income. Boko Haram has sustained itself financially through 
microfinancing, membership fees, external funding/sympathizers, extortion, bank 
robberies, kidnappings for ransom, and illicit trafficking.  
                                                 
7. United Nations Security Council, ZAMUN 2015, Suppression of the Financing of Terrorist Groups 
(New York: United Nations Security Council, 2015),  www.zamun.sk/wp-content/uploads/Guide_SC.pdf. 
8. Murdock, “Analysts: Nigeria’s Boko Haram.” 
9. Stewart and Wroughton, “How Boko Haram is Beating U.S. Efforts.” 
10. Ibid. 
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A. BOKO HARAM MIRCOFINANCING  
The relatively nonviolent Boko Haram from 2002–09, led by Mohammed Yusuf, 
raised money through some basic revenue streams. Yusuf set up a microfinancing system 
for Boko Haram members to open local businesses throughout northern Nigeria, 
predominantly in the states of Borno and Yobe.11 Many of the businesses were car or 
motorcycle taxis. Financing from Yusuf was also used for trading activities and substance 
agriculture. The income generated from businesses opened under the microfinancing 
system would be directed back into operating Boko Haram as an organization.12 
Knowing how much money was generated through the microfinancing system to fund 
Boko Haram is difficult to determine. The microfinancing system that was set up did 
provide Boko Haram with sufficient funds when Boko Haram was being established as 
an organization in the early to mid-2000s. As recently as April 2016, microfinancing 
reemerged as a source of recruits and revenue. International aid organization Mercy 
Corps learned through field research that Boko Haram had been issuing microloans 
ranging from 10,000 naira ($32) to 1 million naira ($32,000) in recent years.13 Loans 
were given in return for pledged financial support. If financial support could not be met, 
then personnel support to Boko Haram was required. With microfinancing being a 
successful means of raising money, it is understandable that Boko Haram would resort 
back to a method that had worked for the organization when it was trying to establish 
itself in the early 2000s.  
B. MEMBERSHIP FEES 
Before 2009, Mohammed Yusuf also raised funds by enforcing organizational 
membership fees. It is believed that Yusuf implemented a daily membership fee of 100 
naira, approximately US$0.80 a day, for the thousands of members.14 Members of the 
                                                 
11. Virginia Comolli, Boko Haram Nigeria’s Islamist Insurgency (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 63, 78. 
12. Ibid., 78–79. 
13. Kieran Guilbert, “Boko Haram ‘Lures, Traps’ Young Nigerian Entrepreneurs with Business 
Loans,” Reuters, April 11, 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-nigeria-boko-haram-
idUKKCN0X8265?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews. 
14. Comolli, Boko Haram, 78. 
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Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) 
and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) believed that, even after Yusuf’s death in 
2009, membership fees were collected until at least 2012.15 With other illicit activities 
bringing in larger sums of money, membership fees might not be a requirement for an 
organization that has shown the ability to fund itself in a variety of ways.  
C. EXTERNAL FUNDING/SYMPATHIZERS 
Boko Haram, as with any VEO, has depended on financial donations from 
sympathizers and external funding from other VEOs. In 2002, Osama Bin Laden sent an 
aide to Nigeria with $3 million.16 Bin Laden’s aide was instructed to disperse the money 
among groups that believed in Al-Qaeda’s cause. The International Crisis Group reported 
that Boko Haram received some of that money, but the exact amount is undetermined.17 
The U.S. Treasury Department has publicly stated that they have evidence that Boko 
Haram has received funding from both Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb 
(AQIM).18 In 2012, Nigerian media reported that the president received intelligence that 
Boko Haram had received a $40 million payment from AQIM (which also operates in 
West Africa); this was reported to be the first of many payments that were to take place 
between the two groups.19 U.S. officials believe if AQIM is still funding Boko Haram, it 
is in very small amounts, not ranging into the millions of dollars.20 
In March of 2015, the current leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, pledged 
allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS). Later that month ISIS’s English-language magazine approved of the alliance with 
                                                 
15. Ibid., 79. 
16. Terrence McCoy, “This is How Boko Haram Funds Its Evil,” Washington Post, June 6, 2014,  
www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/06/this-is-how-boko-haram-funds-its-evil/. 
17.  Ibid. 
18. Kelly Mua Kingsly, Samuel F. Johnson-Rokosu, and Rasaq Alabi Olanrewaju, “Combating Boko 
Haram Terrorism Financing: Case of Nigeria and Lake-Chad Basin,” International Journal of Current 
Research 7, no. 11 (2015): 22849–22861.  
19. Comolli, Boko Haram, 81. 
20. Kingsly, Johnson-Rokosu, and Alabi Olanrewaju, “Combating Boko Haram.”  
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Boko Haram.21 When ISIS accepted Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance, an ISIS 
spokesman informed fellow Muslims looking to join its ranks that “a new door for you to 
migrate to the land of Islam and fight” had opened within Africa.22 In April of 2016, the 
commanding general of the U.S. Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF), 
Brigadier General Donald Bolduc, said that ISIS and Boko Haram are increasingly 
sharing “tactics, techniques and procedures.”23 General Bolduc highlighted that an ISIS 
weapons convoy was detected departing Libya and believed to be headed to the Lake 
Chad region to provide support to Boko Haram.24 However, other than verbal and 
material support, there is no indication that ISIS is providing Boko Haram financial 
support. 
Boko Haram has not only depended on external funding from other VEOs; 
throughout its movement it has received financial support from local sympathizers and 
politicians. One of Boko Haram’s main financial backers was Alhaji Buji Foi. Foi was a 
powerful political figure in Borno State, and at one point in his career he was the 
commissioner for religious affairs in Borno. Foi provided Boko Haram with a substantial 
amount of financial support to run its operations and was a known and open 
sympathizer.25 Many Northern Nigerian politicians have also been accused of giving 
Boko Haram financial support over the years. U.S. government officials confirmed that a 
high-ranking Borno State politician supported Boko Haram financially until 2009.26 The 
actual amount of money politicians gave to Boko Haram is unclear, but it is clear through 
                                                 
21. Blanchard, Nigeria’s Boko Haram. 
22. Peter Pham, “How Boko Haram Became the Islamic State’s West Africa Province,” Journal of 
International Security Affairs, no. 30 (Winter 2016),  www.securityaffairs.org/issues/number-30/how-boko-
haram-became-islamic-states-west-africa-province. 
23. Helene Cooper, “Boko Haram and ISIS Are Collaborating More, U.S. Military Official Says,” New 
York Times, April 20, 2016,  www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/world/africa/boko-haram-and-isis-are-
collaborating-more-us-military-says.html?_r=0. 
24. Helene Cooper, “Boko Haram and ISIS Are Collaborating More, U.S. Military Official Says,” New 
York Times, April 20, 2016,  www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/world/africa/boko-haram-and-isis-are-
collaborating-more-us-military-says.html?_r=0. 
25. Comolli, Boko Haram, 78. 
26. Ibid., 79. 
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arrest and interrogations that political figures throughout Nigeria have supported Boko 
Haram financially.  
D. BANK ROBBERIES 
From 2010 through 2013, Boko Haram relied heavily on bank robberies as a 
source of income. Bank robberies have slowed since a state of emergency was declared 
for Northeastern Nigeria in May 2013. When the spokesperson of Boko Haram, Abu 
Qaqa, was arrested, he provided intelligence on how Boko Haram would use the money 
stolen during bank robberies. Qaqa provided information that money would be 
redistributed among Boko Haram members and the families of members who had been 
killed.27 Boko Haram robbed hundreds of banks over a three-year period for an estimated 
987 million naira ($6 million).28 Boko Haram focused its bank robberies in Borno, Yobe 
and Adamawa regions of Northern Nigeria. Boko Haram justifies robbing banks by 
saying the money it steals is “spoils of war.”29 Bank robberies are still a main source of 
income for Boko Haram, but the number of bank robberies has declined as Boko Haram 
has lost territory over the past two years.  
E. EXTORTION 
Boko Haram has also depended on extortion to procure funds. Boko Haram has 
used extortion methods against business owners, politicians, and citizens. The group has 
persuaded business owners to donate financially to Boko Haram in return for 
“protection.” Politicians and citizens have been threatened with harm to themselves or 
their families if money was not paid.30 Over the past five years, Nigerian citizens have 
received text messages and phone calls demanding money with the threat of harm to the 
individual or their family if they did not pay the amount being asked. These extortion 
                                                 
27. Ibid., 82. 
28. Wasswa D Obi, “Terrorism: Who Pays Boko Haram?,” Nigerian News, last modified 2014, 
www.naij.com/310779-who-pays-to-boko-haram.html. 
29. Kingsly, Johnson-Rokosu, and Alabi Olanrewaju, “Combating Boko Haram.”  
30. Amy Pate, Boko Haram: An Assessment of Strengths, Vulnerabilities, and Policy Options (College 




tactics have also recently been used in Cameroon as Boko Haram has expanded its 
influence outside of Nigeria.31 The amount of money Boko Haram has earned through 
extortion is hard to determine. 
F. KIDNAPPING 
Currently all indications point to kidnapping as Boko Haram’s main source of 
income. Boko Haram has earned millions of dollars conducting kidnappings over the 
years. Boko Haram has kidnapped foreign nationals, most notably a French family 
abducted in Cameroon in February 2013. Boko Haram received an estimated $3.14 
million for the family’s release in April 2013.32 In May 2013, Boko Haram kidnapped a 
former Nigerian petroleum minister who was also the former head of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exploiting Countries (OPEC), receiving a multimillion naira ransom.33 In July 
2014, the wife of Cameroon’s deputy prime minister, along with the local leader of 
Kolofata and his family, was kidnapped by Boko Haram. This kidnapping led to 
Cameroon’s government paying $600,000 for the release of the wife, the local leader and 
his family, and 10 Chinese engineers that were kidnapped in April 2014.34 Boko Haram 
over the years has kidnapped numerous Westerners with the intention of receiving large 
ransoms, but the people feeling the greatest effect of Boko Haram’s kidnapping 
operations are the Nigerians themselves.  
Boko Haram has kidnapped many local elders and Nigerian business owners. 
These kidnappings do not earn millions of dollars per victim, but numerous small 
payments amount to millions of dollars because Boko Haram has kidnapped thousands of 
people over the past five years.35 Boko Haram’s most notorious kidnapping made world 
news with the abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls. On the night of April 14, 2014, Boko 
                                                 
31. Comolli, Boko Haram, 82. 
32. Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad 
Region,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 10 (2014): 8,  www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/boko-haram-recruitment-financing-
and-arms-trafficking-in-the-lake-chad-region. 
33. Comolli, Boko Haram, 83. 
34. Zenn, “Boko Haram,” 8. 
35. Pate, Boko Haram. 
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Haram fighters driving trucks and riding motorcycles raided the town of Chibok, Nigeria. 
Boko Haram left Chibok with 276 girls, all kidnapped from the government secondary 
school.36 After the schoolgirls were in Boko Haram’s custody for a month, Abubakar 
Shekau released a video saying he would sell the girls on the black market. Shekau 
mentions in the video that Allah had instructed him to sell the kidnapped girls. Currently 
no substantial evidence has been found identifying how many schoolgirls have been sold 
on the human trafficking market, but it is believed some have been sold.37 Not only does 
it appear some schoolgirls been sold, but they have also been used as suicide bombers. 
UNICEF estimates that 44 child bombers were used in 2015, 75 percent of whom were 
female and included some of the Chibok schoolgirls.38 No evidence has been uncovered 
to identify exactly how much Boko Haram earned financially, if anything, from 
kidnapping the Chibok school girls.  
G. ILLICIT TRAFFICKING  
With kidnapping and bank robberies being Boko Haram’s main source of income 
in recent years, Boko Haram has begun partaking in illicit trafficking. Most recently 
Boko Haram has engaged in selling stolen cattle as a source of income.39  
Another reported form of trafficking Boko Haram is engaged in is weapons/arms 
trafficking. In June 2014, a Chadian weapons trafficker who worked with a Boko Haram 
commander was arrested with $15,000 on him from sales he made in Chad. Also in June 
2014, Cameroonian authorities discovered travel documents in a Boko Haram camp that 
linked the group to Libya and Qatar.40 Mentioned earlier, the commanding general of 
SOCAF, Brigadier General Bolduc, said an ISIS weapons convoy that departed Libya 
                                                 
36. Mike Smith, Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2016), 
179–185. 
37. Tim Cooks and Isaac Abrak, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Threaten to Sell Kidnapped Schoolgirls,” 
Reuters, May 5, 2014,  www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-bokoharam-idUSBREA440BJ20140505. 
38. Brent Swails and David Mckenzie, “Kidnapped to Kill: Boko Haram is Turning Girls into 
Weapons,” CNN, last modified April 13, 2016, www.cnn.com/2016/04/12/Africa/Cameroon-boko-haram-
child-bombers. 
39. Ndahi Marama, “Boko Haram Now Sells Stolen Cattle to Fund Terror,” Vanguard News, March 5, 
2016,  www.vanguardngr.com/2016/03/boko-haram-now-sells-stolen-cattle-to-fund-terror/. 
40. Zenn, “Boko Haram,” 8. 
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was believed to be headed for Boko Haram.41 Two members of Boko Haram were 
arrested at the Burkina Faso–Niger boarder carrying weapons, ammunition, and 8 million 
CFA franc ($13,500).42 Upon interrogation, the members confessed that the weapons 
were acquired from an arms dealer in Burkina Faso.43  
In June 2012, a courier for Boko Haram was arrested and during interrogation 
admitted that Boko Haram tends to use females to traffic weapons, ammunition, and 
cash.44 Women are preferred as couriers because regional security forces normally do not 
search females since Islamic tenets forbid men from having contact with women who are 
not their wives.45 No substantial reporting has been done to identify exactly how much 
money Boko Haram is making from trafficking weapons.  
It is unclear the degree to which Boko Haram is involved in drug trafficking. The 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency believes Boko Haram has been involved with cocaine 
trafficking.46 Likewise, the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies in 2012 
claimed that Nigerian VEOs were being financed by Latin American drug cartels.47 
Italian journalist Laurettta Napoleoni, an expert on terrorism financing, believes a 
connection between Boko Haram and a Latin American drug cartel was made possible 
because the 2001 Patriot Act made it harder to transfer drugs through the United States to 
Europe.48 In April 2015, in his speech at the second Ministerial Anti-Drug Conference 
on the Influence of Drugs on Global Security and Sustainable Development, UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said Boko Haram was involved in drug trafficking in 
                                                 
41. Cooper, “Boko Haram and ISIS.” 
42. Financial Action Task Force, Terrorist Financing in West Africa (Paris: Financial Action Task 
Force, 2013),  www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/tf-in-west-africa.pdf. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Comolli, Boko Haram, 83. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Committee on Financial Services, April 22, 2015, Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing 
Hearing Entitled “A Survey of Global Terrorism and Terrorist Financing (memorandum) (Washington, DC: 
House of Representatives, 2015), http://financialservices.house.gov/ 
uploadedfiles/042215_tf_memo.pdf. 
47. Kingsly, Johnson-Rokosu, and Alabi Olanrewaju, “Combating Boko Haram.”  
48. Ibid. 
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West Africa.49 Although the secretary-general did not elaborate on how Boko Haram is 
involved, his statement leads to the belief that Boko Haram in one way or another is 
involved in drug trafficking. Through arrest, interrogation and gathered intelligence, 
Boko Haram is known to take part in illicit trafficking. Determining how deep Boko 
Haram’s reach into the illicit trafficking market goes is difficult. With the network Boko 
Haram has established to traffic arms and receive ransoms for kidnapped victims and its 
drug trafficking ties, it is conceivable that Boko Haram traffics in many other things for 
financial gain. The monetary gain that Boko Haram receives from illicit trafficking is 
unknown but can be estimated to be in the low millions of dollars.  
H. SPECULATIONS 
Boko Haram over the past 15 years has funded its operations in a variety of ways. 
One estimate is that Boko Haram had raised approximately $70 million between 2008 
and 2011.50 Knowing how Boko Haram funds itself is critical to being able to counter its 
means of funding, but unsubstantiated speculations into the funding must be avoided 
when addressing the real issue of cutting off its funding. For instance, U.S. congressman 
Darrell Issa, while visiting Nigeria in August 2015, commented that Boko Haram may be 
funded with money coming from crude oil thefts taking place in Southern Nigeria.51 
Congressman Issa’s speculation resulted in the Nigerian government’s standing up a task 
force to look into this claim. There is no evidence at this time that points to Boko 
Haram’s receiving funds from the oil thefts plaguing Southern Nigeria.  
One of the most negative speculations has come from a lead negotiator dealing 
with Boko Haram in releasing the Chibok girls. Dr. Stephen Davis, an Australian 
negotiator who spent four months with Boko Haram, has on numerous occasions claimed 
that Boko Haram uses the Central Bank of Nigeria to move large sums of money. Davis 
                                                 
49. United Nations, “Illicit Drug Trafficking Fuels Terrorism, Undermines Development, Says 
Secretary-General in Message to Ministerial Conference,” press release, April 23 2015,  
www.un.org/press/en/2015/sgsm16694.doc.htm. 
50. Comolli, Boko Haram, 83. 
51. Oscarline Onwuemenyi, “U.S. Fears Boko Haram Funded with Stolen Crude Money,” August 7, 
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 12 
also claims that Boko Haram’s largest supplier of arms and military uniforms lives in 
Egypt.52 No evidence points to the Central Bank of Nigeria’s being involved and the 
bank has called Davis’s claims false.  
I. CONCLUSION ON FUNDING 
Even though more time has been spent writing about Boko Haram as an 
organization than investigating its finances, once fully researched, it is relatively easy to 
understand where Boko Haram’s money has been coming from in recent years. Bank 
robberies and kidnappings have provided Boko Haram a substantial amount of money. 
Terrorist attacks have shown to cost very little compared to what VEOs have in regard to 
their overall finances. Boko Haram is no different. Boko Haram’s reign of terror does not 
cost large sums of money. Boko Haram’s funding is vast, but the tactics and methods it 
employs are low budget and deadly. Understanding Boko Haram’s overall financial 
network (see Figure 1) and highlighting its relationships while working toward solutions 
to disrupt its funding will go a long way to ending Northern Nigeria’s 15-year 
insurgency.  
                                                 
52. Obi, “Terrorism: Who Pays Boko Haram?” 
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Figure 1.  Sources of Boko Haram Funding53 
  
                                                 
53. Source: Arun Kumar, “The Infamous Nigerian Terror Group—Part I,” CreoFire, May 22, 2014, 
http://creofire.com/infamous-nigerian-terror-group-part/. 
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III. COUNTERING BOKO HARAM’S FINANCES 
The United States and the international community took steps prior to and after 
9/11 to address the financing of terrorism. Depending on what approach and laws are 
implemented, the success of countering VEO funding can deliver a number of results. 
Currently Nigeria, the United States, and international partners are using three main 
strategies to counter Boko Haram’s funding. The three approaches can be defined as 
freezing of assets, follow-the-money/arrest, and the technique of denying Boko Haram 
territory. Each of these approaches can be used simultaneously or individually depending 
on the counterthreat financing operation.  
A. FREEZING FINANCIAL ASSETS  
When dealing with any terrorist organization, one of the first steps governments 
take is to identify and freeze monetary assets within financial banking systems. Freezing 
assets of VEOs or their sympathizers relies heavily on legislation. Legislation allows 
countries to legally freeze financial assets and designate individuals as terrorists.54 
Freezing monetary assets has been the approach prior to and after 9/11 that most 
governments have depended on to choke off VEO funding. The ability of terrorist 
organizations to fund their operations through normal financial institutions declined after 
9/11 because the United States and the international community passed laws to prevent 
terrorist financing. Nigeria has the legal framework and appropriate agencies in place to 
freeze Boko Haram assets when identified within Nigerian banks. Nigeria has passed 
numerous laws preventing the support to terrorist organizations and regulating its 
banking system. The Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) is based off of 
recommendations from FATF. NFIU was also admitted into the Egmont Group of 
Financial Intelligence Units in 2007.55 In May 2015, the chief of the Nigeria’s Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) urged Nigerian banks to do more to identify Boko Haram 
                                                 
54. Anne L. Clunan, “U.S. and International Response to Terrorist Financing,” Terrorism Financing 
and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 276. 
55. Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit, “About NFIU,” accessed August 27, 2016,  www.nfiu.gov.ng. 
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funds within in the financial institutions of Nigeria. The DIA chief said that “we told 
them how they should go about intelligence gathering so we expect positive results from 
them.”56  
Even with a financial intelligence unit and pressure put on banks, there is no 
evidence pointing to the Nigerian government’s ever seizing Boko Haram monetary 
assets within a Nigerian financial institution. Two factors could be the cause of the 
Nigerian government’s inability to seize Boko Haram funds within Nigerian banks. One 
factor is Nigerian banks One factor is Nigerian banks may have become reluctant to file 
suspicious transaction reports (STRs) that would help identify possible Boko Haram 
funds in fear of possible repercussions from Boko Haram.57 The second, and most 
important factor, is that Boko Haram does not appear to depend on the formal financial 
sector. As mentioned earlier, Boko Haram uses couriers to move cash throughout 
Northern Nigeria. Omoyele Sowore of Nigeria's citizen journalism website Sahara 
Reporters told the BBC, “Boko Haram commanders and its leaders do not travel with 
passports, they travel on the ground in hijacked vehicles; they do not have any formal 
assets that anyone can point to—it is not a formal organization.”58 The tools and 
techniques used for freezing monetary assets of VEOs since 9/11 seem to be irrelevant 
when dealing with Boko Haram. Reuters journalists Phil Stewart and Lesley Wroughton 
interviewed U.S. officials to understand why the United States has had trouble countering 
Boko Haram’s funding streams. U.S. officials admitted that it is difficult to track and 
identify funding streams due to Boko Haram’s financial operating procedures. Financial 
sanctions and counterfinance measures that were put into place after 9/11 are inadequate 
to have an effect on Boko Haram’s funding.59 
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57. Comolli, Boko Haram, 83. 
58. “UN Committee Imposes Sanctions on Nigeria’s Boko Haram,” BBC, May 2014, 
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27529566. 
59. Stewart and Wroughton, “How Boko Haram is Beating U.S. Efforts.” 
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The U.S. State Department in November 2013 designated Boko Haram as a 
foreign terrorist organization (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act and as specially designated global terrorists (SDGTs) under Executive 
Order 13224.60 Prior to designating Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, the State 
Department in June 2012 labeled Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi, and Abubakar 
Adam Kambar as SDGTs. The FTO and SDGT designations allow the seizure of any 
assets that Boko Haram might have in U.S. financial institutions and criminalizes 
financial transactions with Boko Haram members.61 Laws are in place to ensure that if 
Boko Haram or its sympathizers openly operated within financial institutions, its funds 
would be frozen and useless to it as organization. Boko Haram being labeled an FTO, as 
highlighted in a congressional research report, has not had any impact on its financing. 
No criminal charges have ever been filed in U.S. courts in relation to individuals’ 
providing support to Boko Haram.62  
Freezing the financial assets of Boko Haram seems to be the least effective 
measure for countering its financial support. Having the legal framework in place to 
freeze bank accounts and to designate individuals as SGDTs seems to be more of a 
symbolic gesture than a measure that has any true effect since Boko Haram does not 
appear to be operating within a regulated financial sector. If Boko Haram does operate 
within Nigerian banks, the banks must be willing to file STRs to help the government 
identify Boko Haram’s assets.  
B. FOLLOW-THE-MONEY/ARREST 
The second counterthreat finance measure, follow-the-money, heavily depends on 
intelligence. Anne Clunan, associate professor of national security at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, believes that the intelligence community prefers this method 
because of its ability to track and possibly kill or arrest terrorists.63 Following the money 
                                                 
60. Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy (CRS Report No. RL3964) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016),  www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33964.pdf. 
61. Ibid. 
62. Blanchard, Nigeria’s Boko Haram. 
63. Clunan, “U.S. and International Response to Terrorist Financing,” 277. 
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leads to intelligence that can build a better understanding of how a VEO is operating and 
what the critical financial nodes of the organization are.64 Boko Haram is not immune to 
this concept. Through arrests, many of its financiers and international donors have been 
identified.  
The Nigerian government has cut off some of Boko Haram’s funding through the 
arrest of known supporters. In early 2004, Sheik Muhiddeen Abdullahi, a Sudanese 
Muslim businessman who was the director of a Saudi Arabia funded Islamic charity was 
arrested after transactions in the millions were discovered to have taken place between 
him and a Boko Haram middleman.65 In 2006, Mallam Mohammed Ashafa was arrested 
for receiving funds in Pakistan from two Al-Qaeda operatives and for recruiting 
individuals to travel to Niger to be trained by an Algerian Salifist group.66 And after his 
arrest in 2009, Abdulrasheed Abubakar confessed to authorities that upon Yusuf’s 
request, he went to Afghanistan to learn to make bombs over a three month period. 
Abubakar then returned to Nigeria to train other Boko Haram members in the 
construction of bombs.67 These arrests allowed the Nigerian government and the 
international community to confirm that Al-Qaeda was a financial backer of Boko 
Haram. 
Arrest of Boko Haram members also helped identify that Boko Haram was 
receiving financial support from Nigerian politicians. During the same 2009 battle in 
which Yusuf was arrested and killed, Boko Haram’s main financier Alhaji Buji Foi was 
also executed while in police custody. The result of the 2009 battle drove Boko Haram 
underground till late 2010. In January 2011, Nigerian police arrested Alhaji Bunu Wakil, 
a local contractor and financier of Boko Haram in Maiduguri, along with 91 other 
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supporters of Boko Haram.68 Many of the arrests of suspected Boko Haram financiers 
generated intelligence that led authorities to other suspected financial supporters. The 
arrest of Mohammed Zakaria, a known arms dealer, provided intelligence that led to the 
subsequent killing of Boko Haram sponsor Alhaji Salisu Damaturu in February 2011.69 
With the arrest of Boko Haram members in 2011, Mohammed Ali Ndume (a senator 
from Borno State) and Saidu Pindar (former ambassador to Sao Tome and Principe) were 
identified as financial supporters of Boko Haram.70 Ndume was arrested in November 
2011 and charged with financing Boko Haram.71 In 2012, a Boko Haram spokesperson 
was arrested and proclaimed that Kano State governor Ibrahim Shekaru and Bauchi State 
governor Isa Yuguda were paying fighters an allowance each month.72  
With numerous arrest and killings of Boko Haram financial supporters, Nigeria 
over time has implemented a campaign of follow-the-money that has provided mixed 
reviews. Amnesty International reported in August 2014 that the Nigerian military and 
the Joint Civilian Task Force took part in extrajudicial killings on a regular basis.73 Many 
of the individuals who were being killed were thought to be Boko Haram supporters. 
Nigeria’s military and the Joint Civilian Task Force conducted numerous human rights 
violations. These violations over time caused local Nigerian populations to mistrust the 
military and local security forces. Military and police human rights violations drew 
criticism from the U.S. government. The United States refused to sell machine guns to 
Nigeria and also blocked Israel from selling attack helicopters to Nigeria because of 
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Nigeria’s human rights violations in fighting Boko Haram.74 Since President 
Muhammadu Buhari took office in 2015, he and the Nigerian government have fought 
hard to fight corruption and support for Boko Haram. 
One of the Nigerian government’s recent strategies for cutting off Boko Haram 
funding was the shutting down of cattle markets. The Nigerian government’s use of 
financial intelligence led to the discovery of Boko Haram’s sale of stolen cattle 
throughout northern Nigeria as a means of financial support. In response, in early 2016, 
the Nigerian government closed numerous cattle markets in northeastern Nigeria to cut 
off this source of funding.75 The follow-the-money approach has provided some positive 
results for the Nigerian government. The ability for the Nigerian government to identify 
financial supporters helped illuminate Boko Haram’s international connections and 
highlighted the support Boko Haram was receiving from within its own borders. Arrest 
and follow-the-money methods must continue to be implemented, but these methods 
alone will not completely cripple Boko Haram’s ability to fund its operations.  
C. DENY BOKO HARAM TERRITORY 
The most direct action the Nigerian government has taken to counter Boko 
Haram’s financing has been through denying Boko Haram the ability to live off the land 
that helped finance its operations. Boko Haram has earned the majority of its financial 
support through robbing banks and kidnappings. To deny Boko Haram the opportunity to 
conduct either bank robberies or kidnappings, the Nigerian government has employed a 
number of military operations over the years. Bank robberies and kidnappings were an 
easy source of money for Boko Haram because of the inability of the Nigerian 
government to respond or provide adequate security throughout Northern Nigeria. In the 
summer of 2011, a joint task force (JTF) operation restore order (ORO) was established 
to enable an interagency approach to defeat Boko Haram. Plagued by a lack of troops to 
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root out Boko Haram, the JTF was disbanded in August 2013.76 The JTF ORO did very 
little in cutting off Boko Haram’s ability to fund itself.  
After 2013, the Nigerian government conducted more military operations to try to 
counter the onslaught of Boko Haram. These operations had little success in regaining 
land that Boko Haram used for operations and funding. In March 2015, the Nigerian 
government turned to its neighbors to establish a multination joint task force (MNJTF) to 
confront Boko Haram. The MNJTF is composed of soldiers from Cameroon, Chad, 
Benin, Niger and Nigeria.77 With the implementation of the MNJTF, Boko Haram began 
to lose ground it had gained in 2014 and in 2015. In December 2015, Nigeria’s president 
Muhammadu Buhari asserted that his military was defeating Boko Haram.78 Between 
January and May 2016, the MNJTF killed about 675 and captured another 566 Boko 
Haram fighters according to the MNJTF commander during his remarks at the 2nd 
Regional Security Summit.79 Boko Haram has been declining operationally due to the 
Nigerian and regional military response that has taken place since 2015 and throughout 
2016 (see Figure 2). Instead of occupying territory, Boko Haram has started relying more 
on guerilla tactics to attack the Nigerian military. These tactics have proved difficult for 
the Nigerian military to fully address, but with Boko Haram’s losing territory, its ability 
to launch operations has decreased. With the decrease in territory, kidnappings and bank 
robberies have been on the decline.  
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Figure 2.  Territory Boko Haram Lost Control of from February to April 201580 
The United States has taken numerous steps to help Nigeria, Chad, Niger and 
Cameroon deny Boko Haram the ability to operate. Through the Global Security 
Contingency Fund (GSCF), the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF), and security 
assistance training, the United States has provided counterterrorism assistance worth over 
$400 million to counter Boko Haram.81 The U.S. Department of Defense in 2016 
allocated up to $105 million and requested $125 million for fiscal year 2017 under the 
CTPF program.82 The U.S. State Department has also provided Nigerian officials 
counterthreat finance training through its counterterrorism finance (CTF) program.83 The 
training aimed to restrict Boko Haram’s ability to raise, store, and move money. The 
training has allowed Nigeria to use financial investigators who can work with its 
neighbors to look at financial intelligence to counter Boko Haram.84 Most notably, the 
United States and its international partners have been heavily involved in providing 
Nigeria and its regional partners (Cameroon, Chad, Benin, Niger) military training and 
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equipment to fight Boko Haram. In October 2015, President Obama confirmed that he 
ordered 300 U.S. troops to the region to provide “intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance” to the MNJTF to counter Boko Haram.85  
In February 2016, the director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, told the 
House Intelligence Committee that Boko Haram will remain a threat to Nigeria and its 
neighbors throughout 2016 and into the future.86 Although Nigeria and its partners 
continue to counter Boko Haram and its finances using the three primary aforementioned 
methods, Boko Haram continues to remain a threat. One thing is certain: conventional 
counterthreat finance measures appear insufficiently effective, given the way Boko 
Haram has raised and moved money over time. Since Nigeria has very little to show by 
cutting off Boko Haram’s ability to fund its operations, unconventional counterthreat 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COUNTERING THE 
FINANCING OF BOKO HARAM  
Nigeria and the international community over the years have struggled to suppress 
Boko Haram’s ability to raise money. The Nigerian government has had some success in 
highlighting Boko Haram’s financial support network within Nigeria and internationally. 
Since the election of President Muhammadu Buhari in May of 2015, Nigeria has seen 
positive gains in its fight against Boko Haram. The MNJTF has been successful in 
regaining control of territory once occupied by Boko Haram, the majority of which is 
territory from which Boko Haram launched many of its kidnapping and bank robbery 
operations. Depriving Boko Haram of territorial safe havens will cut into its ability to 
generate funds. With recent military success and positive results in implementing follow-
the-money tactics, Nigeria, with the help from the international community, can further 
disrupt Boko Haram’s ability to fund its existence.  
The following recommendations aim to improve Nigeria’s ability to affect Boko 
Haram’s financing operations. These recommendations, in addition to the MNJTF’s 
denying Boko Haram territorial safe havens, could impact Boko Haram’s ability to rely 
any of its current funding methods. Of the seven funding activities, Boko Haram seems to 
depend heavily on five funding activities: kidnappings, bank robberies, illicit trafficking, 
external funding, and microfinancing. The Nigerian government needs to target each 
funding method to increase its ability to hurt Boko Haram financially. All the 
recommended steps to stop Boko Haram’s current funding streams heavily rely on the 
government of Nigeria’s ability to provide sufficient security throughout northern 
Nigeria.  
Along with addressing the five main funding sources, Nigeria needs to become 
compliant with all FATF recommendations. Ensuring Nigerian financial institutions are 
in compliance with FATF recommendations will deny Boko Haram the capability of ever 
using the regulated financial sector. If Boko Haram is using the regulated financial 
system, which is currently pure speculation, implementing the FATF recommendations 
will surely highlight Boko Haram financial accounts.  
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A. SECURITY  
Providing security seems logical, but the Nigerian government has failed over the 
years to provide adequate security across northern Nigeria. Cited earlier, the government 
of Nigeria in 2011 failed to disrupt Boko Haram’s activities because of a lack of troops to 
support JTF ORO. Nigeria’s governmental leadership must be willing to provide all 
necessary resources to defeat Boko Haram. Boko Haram continues to be engaged in 
kidnappings, bank robberies, illicit trafficking, and microfinancing. The government of 
Nigeria must implement a vigorous security presence within northern Nigeria that hinders 
Boko Haram’s ability to freely move around. Enforcing the declared state of emergency 
for Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, and Niger states is one of many steps that need to be taken 
to increase security. Enforcing curfews and bans on vehicle movement will impact Boko 
Haram’s ability to conduct its financing operations. The success that the MNJTF has had 
over the past year will only be effective if the Nigerian government can remain fully in 
control and have a security presence that allows Nigerians to not live in fear of Boko 
Haram. Having a security apparatus in place to address each of Boko Haram’s funding 
methods is critical.  
1. Preventing Kidnappings  
Kidnappings are believed to be Boko Haram’s main source of funding. To prevent 
kidnappings, a robust security presence will need to be installed to prevent Boko Haram’s 
freedom of movement. The Nigerian government should also educate local populations 
on how to be less susceptible to kidnappings. Nigeria must also implement a policy that 
bans ransom payments to Boko Haram. Nigerians need to understand that ransom 
payments only provide Boko Haram an incentive to conduct more kidnappings. The 
United States and the United Kingdom have each had a longstanding policy of not paying 
ransoms because doing so only increases the likelihood that their citizens would be 
targeted more. This deterrent over time has shown that VEOs tend to target citizens of 
countries that are willing to pay ransoms. In 2011, intelligence showed that AQIM, 
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instead of targeting American and British citizens, was targeting European citizens whose 
countries would be willing to pay for the release of its citizens.87  
Recently a study published in the European Journal of Political Economy showed 
that citizens from countries that paid ransoms faced an 87 percent higher rate of being 
kidnapped than citizens of countries that do not pay ransoms.88 Passing legislation to 
prevent kidnapping ransom payments is a step in the right direction. In 2014, resolution 
2133 was passed by the United Nations Security Council banning the practice of paying 
kidnapping ransoms. Nigeria’s government must implement a no-ransom policy to 
directly affect Boko Haram’s main source of funding. In April 2016, Mark Toner, deputy 
U.S. State Department spokesman, said the United States will continue to support Nigeria 
with intelligence and recommendations to help locate Nigerians kidnapped by Boko 
Haram.89 Continued support from the United States is also critical for pressuring Nigeria 
into implementing a no-ransom policy. Boko Haram has raised millions of dollars by 
conducting kidnappings, and the Nigerian government must address this issue. Adequate 
security, education, and a policy that prevents ransom payments are steps that can be 
taken to prevent Boko Haram from raising money through kidnappings.  
2. Foiling Bank Robberies  
Security located at banks must be increased. Boko Haram’s freedom to conduct 
bank robberies again comes down to the Nigerian government’s not providing the 
required security measures to prevent such actions. Knowing that Boko Haram has raised 
millions of dollars robbing banks, the Nigerian government must introduce security 
mechanisms that make it harder for Boko Haram to conduct this activity. Most developed 
countries provide some form of protection to their financial institutions, especially banks. 
Banks are where the money is, so it is an obvious target for criminals. Nigeria needs to 
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ensure that all banks have security personnel allocated to provide banks protection and 
function as a deterrent. Robbery in Nigeria is a felony with a mandatory sentence of 21 
years, with a possible death penalty sentence for armed robbery.90 Having the legal 
framework in place to deter bank robberies from taking place is not the issue. Boko 
Haram conducts many of its bank robberies with no fewer than 20 heavily armed 
individuals at a time.91  
Not all bank robberies can be stopped, but ensuring sufficient security and 
implementing other measures is critical. Most rural banks in Nigeria lack security 
mechanisms, including surveillance cameras.92 Nigerian banks should implement 
deterrent measures that other countries have put into practice to reduce bank robberies. 
The use of dye packs, bait money, electronic surveillance, and barriers between the teller 
and the customers are all measures Nigeria can emplace to deter bank robberies. Along 
with increased security at banks, the Nigerian government should look at how much 
money each bank should be authorized to have on hand at any given time. Putting a limit 
on the amount of money a bank can have on hand can reduce Boko Haram’s desire to 
conduct bank robberies. The smaller the bank, the less money the bank should have on 
hand. The United States has seen a decline in bank robberies by implementing such 
measures. Over the last 25 years as U.S. banks started employing deterrence measures, 
bank robberies have declined 60 percent.93 Training bank employees on what to do 
during bank robberies is a tool that Nigeria should also put into practice. The American 
Bankers Association (ABA) ensures that American bank employees receive training on 
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the deterrence of bank robberies.94 The Nigerian government should provide bank 
employees recommendations to increase deterrence measures that allow the risk to be 
mitigated before, during, and after a bank robbery. The Nigerian government should 
consider all viable options to deter Boko Haram from its second largest source of 
funding. Enhanced security and deterrence measures at banks can impact Boko Haram’s 
ability to finance its operations through bank robberies.  
3. Illicit Trafficking/External Funding  
With Boko Haram’s illicit trafficking operations taking place across borders, the 
Nigerian government should enhance border security operations. Increasing border 
security will impact Boko Haram’s ability to move freely across borders and its ability to 
take part in illicit trafficking. Impacting illicit trafficking will need to be done through 
multilateral cross-border cooperation. The Nigerian government and its neighbors should 
be willing to work together to secure their borders to impact Boko Haram’s finances. The 
Nigerian government must also educate its citizens on the impacts that buying illicit 
goods has on the legitimate economy. Working with a foreign partner, Nigeria and its 
neighboring countries could receive border security training. Nigeria can look to the 
United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency for training. The U.S. CBP 
provides international partners training that enhances the ability to conduct “more 
effective customs operations, border policing, and immigration inspections.”95 Increasing 
border security will not only affect Boko Haram’s illicit trafficking operations, it will also 
have an impact on other illicit trafficking that transfers through the Lake Chad basin 
region.  
Implementing tougher border security can also have an impact on Boko Haram’s 
receiving support from external funding. Mentioned earlier, Boko Haram in recent years 
has received funding from AQIM. Boko Haram heavily uses cash couriers to transfer 
money within Nigeria and across borders. Increasing border security can possibly impact 
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the ability for Boko Haram to raise money, transfer money, and receive material support 
from other VEOs and sympathizers. Having an effective trained border security force will 
decrease Boko Haram’s ability to rely  on illicit trafficking and will hamper external 
funding.  
B. COMPLIANT FINANCIAL INSTITUITONS  
Even though no evidence points to Boko Haram’s having any financial assets in 
Nigerian banks, it is important to ensure Nigerian banks are fully regulated. Mentioned 
earlier, one possible reason no Boko Haram finances have been seized from a Nigerian 
bank is the unwillingness of bank employees to file an STR in fear of retaliation from 
Boko Haram. The FATF, as recent as of 2012, identified Nigeria as a country that has 
failed to address deficiencies such as money laundering and terrorist financing within its 
banks.96 Having a financial intelligence unit within a country does no good if the banks 
fail to comply with FATF-recommended mandates to address the very issue of terrorism 
financing. Nigeria must work to comply with all FATF mandates to ensure that its 
financial intelligence unit members can identify possible sources or accounts of Boko 
Haram funding. The international community must continue to work with Nigeria to to 
educate its government employees charged with identifying possible funding sources of 
Boko Haram. With Nigeria having the laws in place to seize Boko Haram funding, the 
Nigerian government must ensure that all financial institutions are in compliance with all 
FATF recommendations to prevent terrorism financing. VEOs that have operated within 
a regulated financial sector have seen millions of dollars frozen by countries who meet all 
FATF recommendations. The United States was able to freeze an upward of $174 million 
of terrorist finances in the first four years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.97 To prevent 
terrorism financing, Nigeria needs to understand the importance of having a banking 
system that is fully regulated and compliant with all FATF recommendations.  
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Nigeria has shown success in conducting follow-the-money tactics through 
financial intelligence. With a regulated financial system that abides by all FATF 
recommendations, Nigeria needs to continue to employ financial intelligence to continue 
to identify Boko Haram funding streams. The importance of financial intelligence can 
have far-reaching implications in cutting Boko Haram’s funding off. Financial 
intelligence has had an impact and disrupted numerous VEOs’ finances since 9/11. 
Nigeria must continue to receive counterthreat finance training from the United States. 
Financial intelligence will play a vital role in unraveling Boko Haram’s financial 
network.  
C. MICROFINANCING  
Boko Haram’s popularity at times was driven by the ability to help northern 
Nigerians open businesses through microfinancing. The Nigerian government needs to 
look at providing businesses throughout northern Nigeria the availability of receiving 
microfinancing. Eliminating the population’s need to look to Boko Haram for 
microfinancing will reduce a source of income for Boko Haram. Economic reform in 
northern Nigeria is an important factor for helping reduce Boko Haram’s ability to raise 
money. With security in place, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will be able 
operate freely throughout northern Nigeria. Operating freely will allow NGOs to 
implement a microfinance campaign plan to help northern Nigerians open businesses and 
to address poverty. Even though microfinancing has mixed reviews concerning whether it 
helps or hurts a population, it is certain that Boko Haram is earning money by providing 
loans to local populations in Nigeria. The Nigerian government most work to have its 
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V. CONCLUSION  
Defeating VEOs by cutting off their funding is an approach whose effectiveness 
varies depending on the organization being targeted. U.S. officials have acknowledged 
that the tools used against other VEOs have not been as effective in its financial warfare 
against Boko Haram. Boko Haram has shown the ability to develop a funding stream 
heavily dependent on bank robberies, kidnappings, illicit trafficking, and microfinancing 
to finance its survival. Defeating Boko Haram financially will not be easy, but with the 
measures outlined above, along with the current strategies being implemented, Boko 
Haram could be sufficiently undermined. Defeating Boko Haram financially comes down 
to the government of Nigeria’s willingness to invest the required resources. 
Counterfinance measures alone can have a lasting effect on Boko Haram’s ability to fund 
its operations, but it is only one measure that needs to be taken. Adequate security in 
northern Nigeria is vital and must take place for Boko Haram to feel any effect 
financially. Without the proper amount of security, Boko Haram will be able to 
financially support itself through bank robberies, kidnappings and illicit trafficking. The 
outlined recommendations rely heavily on the placement of security forces throughout 
northern Nigeria. Recognizing the difficulties the Nigerian government faces is 
important. Borno State (Boko Haram’s birthplace) alone is massive in size; it is 2.5 times 
larger than Helmand Province in Afghanistan, where over 10,000 forces were present to 
counter insurgent forces.98 The number of forces needed to counter Boko Haram’s 
funding will stress the Nigeria government to ensure security does not suffer elsewhere in 
the country. Nigeria has a difficult task in ahead, but with support from the United States 
and the international community, Nigeria has the ability to end Boko Haram’s reign of 
terror.  
The United States and its international partners must continue to train the 
Nigerian military and other members of the MNJTF. The United States should continue 
to train Nigerians in counterthreat finance tactics and to put pressure on Nigeria to 
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implement reform measures for northern Nigeria and ensure compliance of all FATF 
recommendations. Boko Haram, over the past 15 years, has become a menace to Nigeria 
and its neighbors. The Nigerian government and international community must adapt and 
find ways to prevent Boko Haram from funding its operations. Denying Boko Haram the 
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